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Abstract
The importance of credit in the monetary transmission mechanism has recently 
attained a lot of attention due to a growing understanding that credit market 
imperfections can have an impact on the monetary policy effectiveness. In 
this study, using Vector Error Correction Models (VECMs) and Structural 
Vector Autoregressions (S-VARs), we go in-depth of the role of credit in the 
Polish monetary policy transmission.
Papers on the role of credit in the money transmission mechanism (MTM) in 
Poland show that the credit channel operates. It seems however, that factors 
through which it affects the aggregate demand might have changed over 
time. The most recent study on the bank-level data suggests that the degree 
of bank liquidity has an impact on its efficiency: the most liquid banks do not 
reduce their loan supply for firms after monetary policy tightening. Previous 
works suggested that bank size and capital as well as variables connected 
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results presented in this study suggest that the monetary policy impact on 
loan supply is, if anything, weak. One of the reasons is that Polish banks hold 
large amounts of highly liquid assets in their portfolios. Banks are therefore 
able to implement buffer-stock behaviour: in response to a tighter monetary 
policy, they can reduce their stocks of most liquid assets and insulate loan 
portfolios. 
To shed some light on the behaviour of the corporate sector we show how 
interest rate shocks affect the indebtedness of various types of firms (private, 
individual ￿ i.e. small privately owned entities employing up to nine persons, 
state-owned). Since the balance sheet channel (one of the concepts within 
the broad credit channel theory) stresses the impact of monetary policy on 
the borrowers￿ balance sheets, we examine the relationship between loans 
and financial standing of firms. We find some support for the hypothesis that 
firms￿ balance sheets are an important factor in the loan supply function. We 
also analyse the reactions of various types of loans, i.e. investment, revolving 
and export credit, as well as real estate and securities loans to monetary policy 
shocks. Our results suggest that after a monetary tightening the response of 
investment loans differs from the response of other types of loans.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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In the foreword to the seminal book on monetary transmission in the euro 
area (Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon (2003)), Otmar Issing wrote that monetary 
transmission is a difficult subject. It seems it can be even more difficult for 
the transitional economies facing a problem of scarce data and rapid changes 
in the economic structure. In the case of Poland, changes in the economic 
structure and economic policy typical for any transitional economy, like 
privatisation or deregulation, are compound with those resulting from the 
EU membership ￿ the elimination of trade barriers, an easier access to labour 
markets of the old-member states and an inflow of membership-related funds. 
All these factors affect the equilibrium interest and exchange rate as well as 
expectations￿ formation, continuously reshape the monetary transmission and 
therefore can have a negative impact on the robustness of empirical analysis. 
In the case of Poland, there is, however, also an important factor that acts in 
the opposite way ￿ it is monetary policy. Since 1998 it has been conducted 
within the same framework which is of key importance in the assessment 
of the properties of the monetary transmission. Thus, a crucial point of any 
empirical study of the transmission mechanism of a transitional economy and 
the new member states of the EU is the robustness analysis. The aim of this 
study is to provide new evidence on monetary transmission in Poland that 
would include the period after EU accession
2 and would cover the period of 
the homogenous monetary policy. We focus on the role of bank loans in the 
monetary transmission.
Bank loans reflect the operation of the traditional interest rate channel as well 
as the credit channel and therefore they are a crucial element of the monetary 
transmission. Disentangling the response of loan supply and loan demand to 
the monetary policy actions is a difficult but necessary condition to identify the 
specific role of these two channels. Many papers bring conflicting results on 
the credit channel operation and therefore well illustrate the related problems 
(see Ehrmann et al. (2003) for the euro area and H￿lsewig, Mayer and 
Wollmersh￿user (2005) for Germany). The identification problem seemed to 
be more acute for the aggregate time series and induced many researchers to 
use the micro level data. However, several recent papers try to cope with the 
identification problem of applying Vector Error Correction Models (VECMs) 
to the aggregate data (H￿lsewig, Winker and Worms (2001) and H￿lsewig, 
2  Poland entered the EU in May 2004.
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Mayer and Wollmersh￿user (2005)). By distinguishing between factors that 
affect loan supply and loan demand they obtain long run loan supply and 
demand functions and in this way verify the existence of the credit channel. 
This study depicts changes in the monetary transmission mechanism (MTM) 
since 2002. Most of the earlier studies of Polish transmission covered the 
period 1996￿2002 (Łyziak (2002), Przystupa (2002), Wr￿bel and Pawłowska 
(2002)). The key result was that the monetary transmission in Poland tended 
to be broadly in line with the ￿stylized facts￿ i.e. monetary policy tightening 
resulted in a hump-shaped downward response of output and prices. However, 
the S-VAR models showed short-lived price and output puzzles. Comparing 
these results to the findings for mature market economies (Peersman and 
Smets (2003) and Mojon and Peersman (2003)) we have observed that the 
reaction of both output and prices in Poland was smaller and slower. On the 
other hand, in response to interest rate increase, the exchange rate appreciated 
as expected. Exchange rate shock (depreciation) resulted in an upward 
movement of output and prices. The estimated exchange rate pass-through 
effect for CPI was much bigger than in mature market economies, but tended 
to decrease (in 2002 it was approximately 0.2 after 8 quarters (Przystupa (2002, 
2006))
3. Empirical research on inflation expectations of consumers shows that 
Polish consumers￿ expectations deviate significantly from the values targeted 
by the NBP. Consumers inefficiently use available information while forming 
their expectations (see Łyziak (2005)). They are highly influenced by current 
inflation rate and past inflation deviations from the target.
Evidence on credit channel operations in Poland is mixed. Early studies 
on monetary transmission on the bank-level data (Wr￿bel and Pawłowska 
(2002)) confirm the existence of the credit channel and point at capitalisation 
and bank size as the characteristics that affect its operation. Later works also 
indicate variables connected with bank risk taking (Chmielewski (2005)). 
However, the most recent analysis (Grabek (2006))shows that the evidence 
for the existence of the credit channel in Poland is not robust and does not 
confirm either the size nor the capitalisation as the characteristics shaping its 
operation. Grabek (2006) shows that the degree of banks￿ liquidity affects 
loan supply to the enterprise sector, but cannot confirm this effect for the 
household sector.
The value added of this study is twofold. Firstly, it sheds some light on the 
monetary transmission in Poland over a period of a homogenous monetary 
3   According to the latest estimates, in 2005 it decreased by almost one half to 0.11. 
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policy (inflation targeting). In many ways this study continues and extends 
our previous research
4. Applying S-VARs we obtain a sketchy picture of the 
monetary transmission. These results, however, do not preclude any of the 
possible channels from affecting the economy. The role of equities in the 
households￿ portfolios is growing, but bearing in mind that monetary policy 
affects their prices only temporarily and that consumption tends to respond 
to permanent changes in wealth rather than transitional ones, we can safely 
assume that the contribution of the wealth channel is modest and therefore 
ascribe the whole effect to the conventional interest rate channel and credit 
channel (we do not treat the exchange rate channel as independent from the 
interest rate). To assess the role of the credit channel we follow H￿lsewig, 
Winker and Worms (2001). Then we use S-VARs to verify the existence of the 
buffer-stock behaviour of banks. We show that the credit channel apparently 
plays a minor role in the monetary transmission in Poland. Secondly, the 
study is the first in the Polish literature to examine the behaviour of various 
types of loans and economic agents (private and state owned firms as well 
as small private entities). To check the robustness and stability of results we 
compare them, whenever possible, with previous studies, and use various 
approaches and data frequencies. Sample shortness practically rules out the 
possibility of using rolling windows.
The remainder of the study is organised as follows: The next part presents the 
key characteristics of the monetary policy framework and financial market in 
Poland. Section 3 summarizes the results of our empirical examination of the 
credit channel operation. We start with a brief theoretical overview. Then we 
show how macroeconomic variables respond to the monetary policy shocks. 
We examine two S-VARs (a  recursive and a  non recursive identification 
scheme) to show how the interest rate and exchange rate affect output and 
prices. Next, we provide evidence on the credit channel operation: we start 
with the aggregate data and show the results of estimation of the long run 
supply and loan demand functions. Since the evidence for the credit channel 
existence is not robust, we devote the next subsection to the disaggregated 
analysis showing behaviour of various types of loans and firms. Finally, we 
discuss the buffer-stock behaviour of banks. Due to the surplus liquidity of 
the banking sector, banks in Poland have large portfolios of liquid assets 
(NBP-bills). Thus, facing monetary policy contraction, banks can potentially 
offset reserves￿ drainage and shield credits. This effect can make the credit 
channel less potent or even eliminate its operation. Owing to the fact that the 
banking sector in Poland is dominated by foreign ownership, banks have an 
4 See  (Łyziak (2002), Przystupa (2002), Wr￿bel, Pawłowska (2002)).
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easy access to foreign markets through their parent entities. We check whether 
they passed-by the credit channel and raised funds in the foreign markets after 
monetary tightening. Section 4 concludes.
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2.  Monetary policy and financial system in Poland
2.1. Monetary policy framework and inflation
Poland has been applying inflation targeting (IT) since 1998. The framework 
has evolved over time, but its core has remained the same. It started quite 
modestly, as an implicit system, to finally take a form of a fully-fledged IT 
framework, comprising of the publication of inflation forecasts on a regular 
basis. The evolution of the IT embraced mostly activities aimed at introducing 
more transparency into monetary policy.
The ground for the IT was set in 1997, when the National Bank of Poland 
(NBP), facing an increasing problem with base money control, implicitly 
replaced M0 with an interest rate as its primary target. 1998 marked 
a  breakthrough for Polish monetary policy, not only because of the IT 
adoption, but also because the new Constitutional Law prohibited debt 
monetization. At that time, price dynamics had been continuously falling, but 
Poland was still experiencing a two-digit inflation rate. The Monetary Policy 
Council (MPC), a new decision-making body, committed itself to reducing 
inflation to a level of below 4% by the end of 2003. Every year the MPC 
fixed the inflation target for the next calendar year (sometimes as a point, 
sometimes as a range). Between 1998 and 2003, the MPC twice changed the 
target for the current year (for the details see Table1). Figure 1 shows actual 
inflation and inflation targets for the period 1998￿2006. To make it more 
readable, we have chosen not to indicate target ranges, instead choosing to 
show the mid-points of respective ranges; the same being done for the years 
in which the target was defined as a point with a tolerance band. The targets 
used to be set in terms of the year-on-year inflation rate in December only, so 
to obtain monthly targets we have interpolated the respective values. Since 
2004 a constant target of 2.5% –1% has been in force.
When examining the role of the exchange rate in overcoming inflation, 
it is worth noting that before 1990 the exchange rate was an accounting 
phenomenon only, with almost no links to the monetary sphere and the real 
sector. To form such links and to anchor inflation expectations, the zloty was 
fixed to the dollar in January 1990 (see Figure 2 and Table A1 in the Appendix). 
The fixed exchange rate of the zloty curbed hyperinflation, but, on the other 
hand, it worsened competitiveness of Polish exports. As a  compromise 
between disinflation and a decline in competitiveness, a regime of having 
a crawling peg to the currency basket was established in October 1991 with 12
the crawling rate gradually decreasing from 1.8% per month to 1.2% in 
February 1995. The crawling peg was combined with a narrow NBP margin 
(–0.5%). This resulted in low exchange rate volatility enhancing credibility 
of this nominal anchor for inflation expectations. The process of exchange 
rate liberalisation continued since the NBP faced increasing problems with 
sterilization of capital inflows, monetary control and inflation decelerating 
too slowly. Thus, to overcome these problems, a crawling band of –7% was 
introduced in May 1995; it was gradually expanded to –15% in March 1999. 
Over this period, the crawling rate was reduced from 1.2% per month to 0.3%. 
As a side effect, exchange rate volatility rose rapidly so the exchange rate 
lost its status as the nominal anchor for inflation expectations. The process 
of exchange rate liberalisation ended up with the official adoption of pure 
float in 2000, but in fact, the NBP decided to refrain from interventions much 
earlier (July 1998).
Over the period 1997 Q1￿2006 Q2 inflation had a clear downward trend 
with two episodes of an upward movement (see Figure 1). The first one 
started in 1999 Q3 and subsisted until 2000 Q3. It resulted from a too-loose 
monetary policy in 1998 and a negative supply shock (increase in oil prices). 
The second one occurred in 2004 and was connected to EU accession. 
Elimination of trade barriers led to a considerable increase in foreign demand 
for domestic foodstuffs and a  related price pressure. Moreover, a  fear of 
future price increases (anticipated increases in VAT rates) induced an increase 
in consumer demand. The upsurge in inflation due to the EU entry was sharp 
but also short-lived ￿ in the second half of the year inflation started to fall. 
 
Table 1 Actual and targeted inflation rate 1998￿2006
Year Target Actual
1998 9.5 8.6*
1999 8.0￿8.5 (changed in March to 6.6￿7.8) 9.8*
2000 5.4￿6.8 8.5*
2001 6.0￿8.0 3.6*
2002 5.0–1pp (changed in June to 3.0–1pp) 0.8*
2003 2￿4 1.7*
2004 2.5–1pp (4.4*); (3.5**)
2005 2.5–1pp (0.7*); (2.1**)
2006 2.5–1pp (1.4*); (1.0**)
* at year end, **year average
Source: Central Statistical Office and own calculations of the authors.
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Figure 1  Inflation rate (CPI, y/y), inflation target, and 1-month WIBOR rate (a proxy 












Source: Central Statistical Office and own calculations of the authors
Figure 2 History of the Polish zloty exchange rate
Source: National Bank of Poland and own calculations of the authors
The history of inflation targeting in Poland ￿ starting from its adoption in 
1998 ￿ was characterized by persistent inflation deviations from the central 
bank inflation target. All short-term targets were missed ￿ even those that 
were revised in the course of the year they had been set for. This was 
caused by supply shocks (food and oil prices), excessive restrictiveness or 
expansiveness of monetary policy as judged ex-post, imperfect knowledge 
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of the monetary transmission mechanism amplified by ongoing structural, 
institutional and behavioural changes in the economy. Target misses might 
have negatively affected the credibility of the NBP. To test the credibility of 
inflation targets, Mackiewicz, Łyziak and Stanisławska (2007) used direct 
measures of consumers￿ and commercial bank analysts￿ inflation expectations 
in line with the literature, suggesting that central bank credibility can be 
measured by a  gap between policy targets or forecasts and the public￿s 
expectations or proxied by the weight λ attached to the inflation target in the 
formation of private sector￿s inflation expectations.
Estimates of the credibility parameter λ in the way suggested by Bomfim 
and Rudebush (1997) show that in the case of consumers λ is significant, but 
negative, implying a lack of credibility. In contrast to consumers, commercial 
bank analysts follow the inflation target closely with a lower weight attached 
to current price changes (see Table 2). The results of our estimations seem to 
be robust with respect to the inflation target measure considered in the test 
equation.
5
Table 2 Estimation of the credibility parameter λ
Measure of the 
NBP target
Consumers￿ inflation expectations 













2 and residuals￿ diagnostics
Official target 





2] ￿ 0.98 [0.98]
DW ￿ 0.75
JB [probability] ￿ 0.09 [0.96]





2] ￿ 0.91 [0.91]
DW ￿ 0.36
JB [probability] ￿ 4.03 [0.13]







2] ￿ 0.98 [0.98]
DW ￿ 0.69
JB [probability] ￿ 0.48 [0.78]





2] ￿ 0.96 [0.96]
DW ￿ 0.23
JB [probability] ￿ 2.35 [0.31]
ADF [probability] ￿ -7.84 [0.00]
(1) T = t + 12, sample period: 1998:10￿2004:12, equations are estimated by OLS using the covariance 
matrix corrections suggested by Newey and West (1987).
(2) T = t + 12 until October 2000 and T = t + 11 since November 2000, sample period: 1998:10 to 2004:12, 
equations are estimated by OLS using the covariance matrix corrections suggested by Newey and West 
(1987).
Source: Mackiewicz, Łyziak, Stanisławska (2007), p. 74.
However, as underlined by Mackiewicz, Łyziak and Stanisławska (2007), 
the probability of future inflation being within the NBP target range was 
characterized by a  positive trend both in the case of commercial bank 
5 Two continuous inflation target measures were derived on the basis of point targets applied 
between 1998￿2003, namely: the official target for a given year and the linearly interpolated target. 
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economists and consumers (Figure 3). There were two exceptions to this 
tendency: a  rapid disinflation in 2002-2003 and the EU-accession shock 
in 2004. Excluding these episodes, we may say that there is a  growing 
credibility, although in the case of consumers, there is still room for 
a significant improvement.
Figure 3    Probability of future inflation being within the NBP inflation target range 






















































































































































































PR(TAR) PR(TAR_IP) PR(TAR) PR(TAR_IP)
TAR ￿ official inflation target for a given year
TAR_IP ￿ interpolated inflation target
Source: Mackiewicz, Łyziak and Stanisławska (2007), p. 75.
2.2. Financial system and banking sector: an overview
The structure of the financial sector is a key determinant of the monetary 
transmission mechanism and the credit channel in particular; therefore in this 
section we discuss the main characteristics of the financial sector in more 
detail. We show that although non-bank intermediaries have been developing 
rapidly since the mid-1990s, it is still dominated by banks. Thus, in the section 
that follows, we shall concentrate on the banking sector and discuss its basic 
characteristics: ownership structure, concentration level, term structure of 
assets and liabilities as well the breakdown of assets and liabilities by currency. 
For the analysis of the transmission mechanism ￿ its strength and lags ￿ it is 
important to stress that investment in Poland is predominantly financed from 
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investors￿ own resources ￿ in 2004 economic entities (employing more than 
49 persons) financed some 9% of investment outlays using domestic credits 
and another 3% using credit from foreign sources. 
The level of financial intermediation in Poland is relatively low but is steadily 
increasing. This is well illustrated by the ratio of financial system assets to 
GDP ￿ in 2005 this ratio was around 86%, whereas in the other new member 
states, like the Czech Republic or Hungary ￿ it amounted to around 120%. 
Banks remain the main financial intermediary, currently holding some 70% of 
total assets, but their role is apparently decreasing (Table 3 and Table 4). Since 
1997 open pension funds, investment funds and credit unions have developed 
most rapidly (Table 4). The development of non-banking institutions is 
reflected in the parallel advances of new financial services and instruments 
offered by these institutions, e.g. leasing or venture capital. In Poland leasing 
is mostly used by small and medium enterprises. In 2003 about 30% of 
enterprises reported the use of leasing, while 50% of firms used bank loans. 
The value of leased assets related to GDP is relatively low when compared 
with the European leaders ￿ UK and Germany: in 2005 it amounted to 1.7%, 
but is comparable to the respective levels in Denmark or Norway. Private 
equity/venture capital ￿ although growing ￿ does not play a significant role 
as a source of financing in the enterprise sector. The value of PE/VE related 
to GDP is below 1%. Likewise, corporate bonds do not count much in firms 
financing ￿ their value relative to GDP varies within a range of 1.3￿2% and 
does not display any significant movement upwards. On the other hand, the 
stock exchange has recently become an important source of financing: its 
capitalisation relative to GDP increased from being as low as 13% in 1998 to 
31.9% in 2005
6.
The level of intermediation in Poland and the distance of banking sector 
development between Poland and the other new member states, as well as the 
euro area are presented in Table 5. 
6 All figures concerning financial market come from: ￿Financial Market in Poland 1998￿
2001￿ and ￿Financial System Development in Poland (2004), (2005)￿.
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Table 3  Assets of financial institutions in Poland (PLN bn)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Commercial and 
cooperative banks 247.7 318.7 363.4 428.5 469.7 466.5 489.0 538.5 587.0
Credit unions 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.8 2.5 3.4 4.2 5.3
Insurance companies 13.2 20.7 28.9 37.9 48.0 57.5 65.7 77.9 89.6
Investment funds 1.9 1.8 3.1 9.5 12.1 22.8 33.2 37.5 61.3
Open pension funds 0.0 0.0 2.3 9.9 19.4 31.6 44.8 62.6 86.1
Brokerage firms 3.0 3.2 3.6 3.9 2.9 2.8 3.7 5.5 6.9
Total assets 266.2 345.0 402.2 490.9 553.9 583.7 639.8 726.2 836.2
Source: NBP
Table 4  Assets of financial institutions in Poland (as a share of total assets)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Commercial and 
cooperative banks 93.05 92.38 90.35 87.29 84.80 79.92 76.43 74.15 70.20
Credit unions 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.24 0.32 0.43 0.53 0.58 0.63
Insurance companies 4.96 6.00 7.19 7.72 8.67 9.85 10.27 10.73 10.72
Investment funds 0.71 0.52 0.77 1.94 2.18 3.91 5.19 5.16 7.33
Open pension funds 0.00 0.00 0.57 2.02 3.50 5.41 7.00 8.62 10.30
Brokerage firms 1.13 0.93 0.90 0.79 0.52 0.48 0.58 0.76 0.83
Total assets 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: NBP
Table 5    Banking sector development: Poland, other new member states and the 
euro area, 2005
Country Assets/GDP (in %) Loans/GDP (in %) Deposits/GDP (in %)
Poland 60.7 26.7 34.0
Czech Republic 100.8 32.1 58.0
Hungary 80.6 39.5 40.0
Euro area 283.3 116.0* 96.0*
* data for 2004
Source: NBP
Ownership structure of the banking sector
The banking sector in Poland is dominated by foreign banks: in 2005 the share 
of foreign banks￿ assets amounted to 70% of total assets. The role of foreign 
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banks increased sharply in 1999￿2000 in the aftermath of Poland￿s decision 
to discontinue a privatisation strategy which assumed that the state would 
retain about 30% of the total shares issued, 30% of shares would be taken 
over by a foreign strategic investor and 30% of shares would be offered to 
individual investors as a public offering and to employees on privileged terms. 
Foreign investors confronted with the continued presence of a powerful state 
shareholder were not interested in buying shares in Polish banks. A change 
in the attitude towards foreign investors resulted in the privatisation of three 
big state-owned banks (Bank Przemysłowo-Handlowy, Polska Kasa Opieki 
S.A. and Bank Zachodni). Since then the ownership structures have only 
undergone minor changes (Table 6 shows the share held by foreign banks of 
total assets of the banking sector).
Table 6  Banking sector ownership structure, 1997￿2005
Share of banking sector assets, in %
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Commercial banks 95.5 95.7 95.8 95.8 95.4 95.0 94.8 94.7 94.2
with majority public 
sector interest 49.3 45.9 23.9 22.9 23.5 25.1 24.4 20.5 20.3
with majority private 
sector interest 46.2 49.8 71.8 72.9 71.9 69.9 70.4 74.2 74.0
- Polish 30.9 32.2 24.6 3.4 3.2 2.5 2.6 6.6 4.0
- foreign 15.3 16.6 47.2 69.5 68.7 67.4 67.8 67.6 70.0
Cooperative banks 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.6 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.8
Source: NBP
Concentration level
The concentration level of the banking sector measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for net assets, deposits and gross 
loans is low (if the HHI is below 0.1, the market is considered to be not 
concentrated). The index has been falling since 2001 due to the fact that small 
and medium-sized banks have been developing faster than the large ones. 
A previous rise in the level of concentration was due to bank mergers. A similar 
picture emerges from the analysis of other measures of concentration: indices 
CR5, CR10, CR15 (Figure A1 in the Appendix) representing the market share 
of the 5, 10, and 15 largest banks respectively, which exhibit the same pattern 
i.e. the expansion of smaller entities.
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Table 7     Concentration of commercial banks: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) , 
1997￿2005 (0=no concentration; 1=full concentration)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Assets 0.0739 0.0675 0.0791 0.0761 0.0894 0.0877 0.0839 0.0773 0.0732
Deposits 0.0885 0.0777 0.0824 0.0798 0.0943 0.0932 0.0977 0.0888 0.0856
Gross loans 0.0505 0.0452 0.0606 0.0604 0.0762 0.0767 0.0709 0.0717 0.0724
Source: NBP
Deposits and loans: term and currency structure
Non-financial sector deposits are mostly short-term: these of maturity up to 
one year (including current account deposits) amount to about 90% of total 
PLN deposits. Between 1997 and 2005 there was a clear-cut change in the 
term structure of deposits: the share of these with the shortest maturities was 
increasing at the expense of longer maturities. This phenomenon reflected 
the households￿ change in attitudes towards savings patterns: longer term 
savings were removed from banks and deposited with investment funds. 
Deposits in foreign currencies amount to about 15￿17% of the total amount 
of deposits. The process of zloty appreciation (Figure 2) and the low inflation 
rate discourage households from deposits in foreign currencies. On the other 
hand, exporting firms may want to hold such deposits to lessen the negative 
influence of exchange rate appreciation.
Bank loans to households and firms are dominated by loans with the shortest 
maturity (in the current account and up to one year) and by loans of maturity 
exceeding 5 years. In contrast to deposits in foreign currencies, the role of 
loans denominated in foreign currencies has been growing (see Figure 4). 
The latter phenomenon is mostly due to households￿ preference for long-term 
loans denominated in foreign currencies and results from the interest rate 
disparity between the Polish zloty (PLN) and the European currencies (CHF, 
EUR) In 2006, the Committee for Banking Supervision, concerned about the 
rapid increase in demand for foreign currency loans and its possible negative 
consequences for the stability of the banking system, issued a  regulation 
(known as ￿Recommendation S￿) which tightened households￿ eligibility 
conditions for foreign currency loans. A considerable role played by deposits 
and especially by the loans denominated in foreign currencies makes monetary 
transmission weaker, since domestic interest rates affect directly only a part 
of banks￿ assets and liabilities. In the following section, we shall consider 
the loans denominated in the domestic currency only. Foreign currency loans 
require separate analysis. 
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Liquidity
The Polish banking sector has been exhibiting surplus liquidity
7 since the 
mid-1990s. It has aroused as a result of capital inflows which started when 
Poland restructured its foreign debt (see: Table A2 in the Appendix). Since 
then, the NBP has been conducting absorbing open market operations. After 
a  temporary slowdown in the process of surplus liquidity build-up over 
2001 Q3￿2004.Q2, it re-started in the second half of 2004 due to an inflow of 
the EU membership-related funds. Funds which are to be used in the domestic 
currency are converted by the NBP creating additional liquidity. The scale 
of the surplus liquidity, approximated by the outstanding stock of NBP bills 
compared with loans to firms and households is shown in Figure A2 in the 
Appendix.
Surplus liquidity has the potential to affect the interest rate pass-through 
and therefore can weaken both the interest rate channel and credit channel 
operation. It is easier for banks having surplus liquidity to insulate loans 
from a  monetary policy tightening by the central bank. But whether this 
potential materialises is an empirical question. Ganley (undated) reports no 
significant pass-through problems in a number of countries exhibiting surplus 
7  Surplus liquidity occurs where the banks￿ working balances on accounts at the central bank 
persistently exceed the required level of reserves. Transitional countries are among the most prone 
to liquidity surpluses, see: Ganley (undated).
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liquidity ￿ the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary and South Africa. Previous 
estimates on the interest rate pass-through in Poland (Wr￿bel and Pawłowska 
(2002)) did not show signs of a disruptive influence of the surplus liquidity. 
Examining a  sample of monthly data between 1995.01 and 2002.02 they 
concluded that the instantaneous adjustment of retail rates to money market 
rates was only partial, but in the longer-run most deposit rates and loan rates 
adjusted fully, with the consumer credit rate being the most striking exception. 
They ascribed such behaviour of the consumer credit rate to poorer collateral. 
In sum, the picture of the interest rate pass-through emerging from these 
estimates was akin to the one obtained for the euro area (De Bondt (2002)) 
The latest estimates of the interest rate pass-through for the period February 
2002 to April 2006.
8 (Wr￿bel (2006)) shows that the deposit rates have 
adjusted less than in the past. The opposite seems, however, to be true for the 
loan rates for the corporate sector. The result is presumably period-specific 
and the shortness of the sample can be an important factor explaining this 
phenomenon. Over-reaction of loan rates was probably a by-product of fierce 
competition in the credit market on the eve of EU entry.
8  Due to the changes in monetary statistics in February 2002, earlier data on the retail interest 
rates is not fully comparable, so we have used two subsamples.
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3.  Monetary transmission mechanism ￿ theoretical 
remarks and the new empirical research
3.1. Theoretical remarks
In the traditional interest rate channel an increase in the short term central 
bank interest rate leads to an increase in longer rates ￿ deposit and loan rates 
as well as yields on Treasury bills and bonds ￿ and to a dip in equities and 
real estate prices. In the world of sticky prices an increase in nominal rates 
leads to an increase in real rates. An increase in investment cost depresses 
investment, while consumption falls due to both wealth effect and substitution 
effect. As a result, total output declines, bringing down the inflation rate. In 
short, for the interest rate channel to be operative the central bank must have 
a possibility to control the short-term interest rate, prices need to be sticky, 
and finally output should react to real rates.
According to the credit channel theory of monetary transmission, monetary 
policy has a  direct effect on aggregate spending that does not operate 
through the traditional interest rate channel. The main assumption is that 
banks play a special role in the financial system, since they are especially 
well suited to deal with certain types of borrowers, in particular small 
enterprises and households whose access to the capital market is difficult. 
Monetary contraction drains reserves and ￿ reducing banks￿ lending ability 
￿ has an impact on bank-dependent borrowers. As a result of the tightening 
of monetary policy, credit allocated to bank-dependent borrowers may fall, 
making these agents cut their spending (Hubbard (1994)). 
The credit channel is not a separate, independent alternative to the traditional 
interest rate channel, but rather a set of supplementary factors that amplify and 
propagate it (Ramey (1993)). The direct effects of monetary policy on interest 
rates in the banking sector are amplified by endogenous changes in the 
external finance premium, which is a difference between the cost of funds 
raised externally (by issuing equity or debt instruments) and funds generated 
internally (by retaining earnings). The size of the external finance premium 
reflects imperfections in the credit markets that drive a wedge between the 
return expected by lenders and the cost faced by potential borrowers. In 
the ￿credit view￿, a change in monetary policy that raises or lowers interest 
rates tends to change the external finance premium in the same direction. 
￿Because of this additional effect of policy on the external finance premium, 24
the impact of monetary policy on the cost of borrowing broadly defined ￿ and, 
consequently, on real spending and real activity ￿ is magnified￿ (Bernanke 
and Gertler (1995)). 
There are two basic explanations why actions taken by the central bank affect 
external finance premium in credit markets. The first one ￿ the balance sheet 
channel ￿ stresses the impact of monetary policy on borrowers￿ balance sheets 
and their wealth, which constraints their debt capacity
9. The second ￿ the 
bank lending channel ￿ focuses on the possible effects of monetary policy 
actions on the loan supply.
In the bank lending view, banks play a critical role in the transmission of 
monetary policy actions to the real economy. Changes in monetary policy 
generate adjustments not only in interest rates, but also in the banking sector 
balance sheet. Walsh (2003) points out that ￿the ultimate effects on bank 
deposits and the supply of money are reflected in adjustments to the liability 
side of the banking sector￿s balance sheet. The effects on banking-sector 
reserves and interest rates also influence the supply of bank credit, the asset 
side of the balance sheet. If banks cannot offset a decline in reserves by 
adjusting securities holdings or raising funds through issuing nonreservable 
liabilities (such as CDs in the United States), bank lending must contract. If 
bank lending is ￿special￿ in the sense that bank borrowers do not have close 
substitutes for obtaining funds, variation in the availability of bank lending 
may have an independent impact on aggregate spending. Key then to the 
bank lending channel is the lack of close substitutes for deposit liabilities 
on the liability side of the banking sector balance sheet and the lack of close 
substitutes for bank credit on the part of borrowers. Imperfect information 
plays an important role in credit markets, and bank credit may be ￿special￿, 
that is, have no close substitutes, because of information advantages banks 
have in providing both transactions services and credit to business. Small 
firms in particular may have difficulty obtaining funding from nonbank 
sources, so a contraction in bank lending will force these firms to contract 
their activities￿. There are two necessary conditions that must be fulfilled for 
a bank lending channel to exist, (Ramey (1993)): firstly, banks should not be 
capable of shielding their loan portfolios from changes in monetary policy; 
in other words, monetary policy actions should influence banks￿ loan supply; 
9 According to the interest rate channel, banks ￿ facing tightening in monetary policy ￿ raise 
lending rates and thus affect demand for credit. Empirical evidence from the USA shows that 
banks first respond to changes in the cost and availability of loanable funds by changing non-price 
lending terms and conditions of lending, i.e. adjusting credit supply. Only then they change 
interest rates (Schreft and Owens (1991)).
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and secondly, borrowers (at least a part of them) should not be able to fully 
insulate their spending from changes in the availability of bank credit.
The broad credit channel is not restricted to the bank lending channel. 
The balance sheet channel stresses the importance of costs associated with 
information asymmetries and the inability of lenders to monitor borrowers 
costlessly. As a result, cash flow and net worth become important factors 
affecting the cost and availability of finance and the level of investment 
spending. The main idea of the balance sheet channel is that the external 
finance premium depends inversely on a borrower￿s creditworthiness, which 
in turn depends on macroeconomic conditions and therefore on the monetary 
policy (de Bondt (1999)). In particular, contractionary monetary policy that 
produces an economic slow-down reduces firm cash flow and profits, and by 
weakening creditworthiness increases the external finance premium generating 
a  so-called financial accelerator effect. ￿Financial accelerator effects can 
arise from the adjustment of asset prices to contractionary monetary policy. 
Borrowers may be limited in the amount they can borrow by the value of their 
assets that can serve as collateral. A rise in interest rates that lowers asset 
prices reduces the market volume of borrowers￿ collateral. This reduction in 
value may then force some firms to reduce investment spending as their ability 
to borrow declines￿ (Walsh (2003)).
3.2.  Interest rate channel and bank lending channel effects
3.2.1.  From a policy variable to output and prices
In this section we examine stylized facts of the monetary transmission. Using 
structural vector autoregression (S-VAR) models we determine the monetary 
policy shock and then discuss impulse responses of output and prices to 
both the interest rate shock and the exchange rate shock. Since the impulse 
responses can substantially differ in various identification schemes, we use 
two identification methods: Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1994, 1998) ￿ 
hereafter referred to as CEE, and Kim and Roubini (1995). This should provide 
arguments for the robustness of results. In the first method, monetary policy 
shock is identified through a  standard Cholesky recursive decomposition, 
whereas in the second one ￿ through a non-recursive decomposition. 
To identify the monetary policy shock in line with CEE, one must make 
assumptions on variables the monetary authority considers when setting 
the level of the policy instrument, and the interaction between variables in 
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the information set and the monetary policy shock. Thus, we assume that 
a  central bank observes developments in the world economy (prices and 
interest rates) as well as developments in domestic output and prices. Using 
this information, a central bank sets its short-term interest rate accordingly. 
Furthermore, we assume that variables included in the information set 
considered by the central bank react to the monetary policy impulses with 
a lag. The exchange rate is assumed to react contemporaneously to interest 
rate developments, but the interest rate does not respond contemporaneously 
to the exchange rate. Thus, the ordering of the variables is as in (2). This 
identification method has, however, two serious shortcomings: it is not only 
more suitable for a large closed economy, like the US, but it also relies on 
the assumption that the monetary authority reacts to the contemporaneous 
price and output developments though in practice, due to lags in the statistical 
data availability, it does not. In contrast to the CEE identification scheme, 
in the Kim-Roubini-type decomposition, monetary policy rule takes into 
account data which can currently be observed, namely ￿ foreign interest 
rate and the monetary aggregate (one must, however, bear in mind that 
these variables are not of primary importance for the monetary authority 
within the inflation targeting framework). Moreover, in the Kim-Roubini 
identification scheme, the exchange rate is allowed to react simultaneously 
to the developments in the monetary policy instrument and the interest rate 
reacts contemporaneously to exchange rate fluctuations. The latter feature of 
the Kim-Roubini identification scheme makes it more suitable for the analysis 
of the monetary policy shocks in the open economies. 
Our VAR includes 7 variables: world oil price (Brent in USD) ￿ denoted 
as  p
oil, introduced to estimate the effects of a  supply shock and to avoid 
misspecification that usually leads to price puzzles; foreign interest rate ￿ i
f 
(either 1-month LIBOR or 1-month EURIBOR), domestic output (proxied by 
industrial production) ￿ y, consumer prices denoted as p, monetary aggregate 
M0 ￿ m, 1-month interbank domestic interest rate which represents monetary 
policy instrument, i, and either the PLN/USD or PLN/EUR exchange rate, e. 
We analyse impulse responses to the bilateral exchange rate shocks instead 
of effective exchange rates shocks, since we believe that depreciation with 
respect to the US dollar and the euro should bring about various responses of 
output and prices reflecting the specific role of both currencies in the Polish 
foreign exchange market and in the economy as a whole. Up to 2003, the 
foreign exchange market was dominated by the US dollar, since then the 
dollar has been replaced by the euro. Over the whole period the euro seems 
to be more important for the real sector (due to the role of trade exchange 
between Polish and EU firms). 
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The estimates are based on monthly data, so we use industrial production instead 
of the GDP as a variable representing the real sector of the economy. The lag 
length of the VAR is determined by the information criteria, but we also consider 
autocorrelation of the error term. Data series have been seasonally adjusted with 
X-12. Centred seasonal dummies were introduced where necessary to eliminate 
the rests of seasonality and autocorrelation of the error term. 




The CEE identification procedure uses Cholesky decomposition, i.e. A matrix 
is lower triangular, whereas in the case of Kim and Roubini (1977)-type 
decomposition, the matrix A0 is following:
(3)
In this specification real activity is contemporaneously affected by oil prices; 
domestic prices ￿ by oil prices as well, but also by the current output. Both 
react to the interest rate and exchange rate shocks with a delay. The fifth row 
of matrix A represents demand for money ￿ it responds contemporaneously to 
the output, prices and the short-term interest rate. The interest rate is set taking 
into account contemporaneous developments in oil prices (supply shocks), 
monetary aggregate and the exchange rate. The last row reflects the assumption 
that the exchange rate reacts contemporaneously to all other variables. The 
S-VAR is over-identified, but the over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected 
(χ
2(5) = 3.17, prob.: 0.67 for the specification with PLN/EUR exchange rate and 
χ
2(5) = 2.99, prob.: 0.70 for the specification with PLN/USD exchange rate).
The results of the CEE identification scheme and Kim-Roubini-type are 
shown in Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8. 
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The main conclusion that arises from Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 
8 is that the two identifications bring about similar results as far as price and 
exchange rate responses to the monetary policy shocks are considered, but 
somewhat different in the case of output reaction. Specifically, the output 
reaction in the CEE identification is more hump-shaped than in the Kim and 
Roubini identification. In the former, the maximum reaction of output occurs 
about 12 months after the shock, in the latter it is as soon as 2 to 5 months. 
In any case, the output reaction seems to be faster than it was in our previous 
study (Wr￿bel and Pawłowska (2002)) and the difference is considerable, 
amounting to 6 months. Output reaction to the exchange rate shock is shorter 
than in our previous estimates and as expected, there is a clear-cut difference in 
the output reaction to PLN/EUR and PLN/USD shocks. In both identifications 
the cumulated output response to the former is bigger than to the latter, 
confirming the importance of trade exchange with the EU countries, and the 
euro area in particular. The reaction of the price level is bigger and occurs 
earlier than in the previous estimates. Now the maximum reaction occurs 
16￿20 months after the shock, while in Wr￿bel and Pawłowska (2002) it was 
20￿25 months. There are no major changes in the exchange rate reaction to 
the interest rate shock ￿ monetary policy tightening leads to the appreciation, 
yet somewhat bigger than previously observed. A plausible interpretation of 
these results would point at advances in the monetary propagation ￿ e.g. more 
flexibility of the real sector, and changes in the monetary policy. These two 
factors would explain a bigger reaction of prices and quicker response of the 
industrial output. This finding complies to some extent with the recent results 
for developed market economies (Kuttner and Mosser (2002)). They suggest 
that financial innovation, improved inventory management resulting from the 
progress in the information technology, as well as the conduct of monetary 
policy diminish the sensitivity of the real sector of the US economy to the 
federal funds rate. Without doubt, this list should be complemented with 
factors connected with globalisation. We cannot exclude however, that what 
we observe in Poland as increased responsiveness of inflation to the interest 
rate is at least in part also due to a better identification of the monetary policy 
shock resulting from the homogeneity of the monetary policy framework over 
the period covered by the estimates.
To sum up, our vector autoregressions bring responses which are consistent 
with the stylized facts for a  small open economy with nominal and real 
rigidities. There is some evidence that monetary transmission has accelerated. 
However, the picture of the monetary transmission is somewhat blurred by 
the reaction of the monetary aggregate to the policy rate: there is no clear-cut 
drop in money demand in response to the monetary policy tightening but 
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this effect may to some extent result from changes in the ratio of required 
reserves
10.
Figure  5    Impulse response functions, CEE￿type identification (responses to the 
monetary policy shock ￿ upper panel, responses to the exchange rate shock 
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10 A tentative introduction of the required reserves ratio as an exogenous variable resulted in 
serial correlation of the error term.
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Figure  6    Impulse response functions, CEE￿type identification (responses to the 
monetary policy shock ￿ upper panel, responses to the exchange rate shock 
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3.2.2.  Credit channel ￿ aggregated data
This part of the study is aimed at showing the role the credit channel plays 
in the monetary transmission in Poland. For the bank lending channel to be 
operative a central bank must be able to affect the loan supply. If banks are 
able to offset a decrease in deposits resulting from a central bank￿s purchase 
of T-bills via open market operations, then the lending channel will not 
affect the real sector. In other words, if banks are able to raise funds from 
other sources ￿ issue CDs, liquidate treasuries or resort to foreign markets, 
they can insulate against the decrease in demand deposits. In the case of 
Poland two of these are particularly important: due to the surplus liquidity 
banks have big portfolios of liquid papers, i.e. NBP-bills and as a result of 
the ownership structure, they can easily get funds from their parent entities. 
Funds obtained from the parent entity, either in the form of debt or equities, 
are relatively cheap, since subsidiaries do not face information asymmetries. 
There is some empirical evidence demonstrating that in Germany banks 
raise funds in foreign markets after monetary policy tightening Ehrmann and 
Worms (2001). In what follows we check whether banks in Poland used both 
possibilities of passing-by the lending channel, however taking into account 
that surplus liquidity means that banks hold a bigger than desired portfolio 
of liquid assets, and that liquidating them is ￿ if anything ￿ simple and fast 
way of raising funds, and basing on our previous research on the buffer stock 
behaviour of banks (Łyziak (2000)), we can suspect that in Poland banks 
relied more on their portfolio of liquid securities than on funds raised through 
the parent entities in the foreign markets.
To check the existence of credit channel we follow H￿lsewig, Winker and 
Worms (2001) and H￿lsewig, Mayer and Wollmersh￿user (2005) who build 
a vector error correction model and then estimate the restricted co-integrating 
vectors which represent the long-run loan supply and demand functions. 
Supply of loans depends on the credit margin, i.e. the spread between loan 
rate and the policy rate, and on banks￿ capital, while the loan demand depends 
on the GDP and the policy rate. 
We build our estimates on the following assumptions: a bank increases its 
loan supply with an increase in the loan rate and reduces it with the policy rate 
increases. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) suggest that the demand for credit 
increases with output (scale variable). We accept this view for the long-run 
estimates. In the short run however, we allow for a fall in the loan demand 
with output increases, since a better financial standing of firms enables them 
to finance their investment expenditures from retained earnings. Thus, in the 
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short run the response of loans to an output shock may be either positive, 
or negative. Further, we assume that the loan supply and demand react to 
the interest rate shocks with a  delay. This is due to the cost of portfolio 
adjustment and some inertia in the investment process. In line with the credit 
channel or the bank lending concepts, we assume that the monetary policy 
tightening affects negatively net worth of firms and limits the possibility of 
financing investment expenditures from their own sources. Thus, a firm that 
is planning to invest has to resort to the external financing and its balance 
sheet can affect a bank￿s willingness to extend a loan. On the other hand, due 
to the reserves drainage, banks are more reluctant to expand loans. The same 
effect may result from an adverse shock to banks￿ capital. 
To sum up, we use a model of loan supply and loan demand according to the 
following formula:
l










d = f (yt, it
loan). (5)
We specify loan supply and loan demand functions using a VECM according 
to the following formula:
 
, (6)
where Zt is a vector of endogenous variables integrated of order one, Dt is 
a vector of constant terms (seasonal dummies), and 




Zt = (yt, lt, i
p, i
loan, losst)·. (7b)
In the above specification, y is GDP, l stands for loans to firms and households 
in real terms, i
p is the short-term money market interest rate that proxies the 
policy rate (WIBOR 1M), i
loan represents the loan rate (3-year loans to firms), 
and loss stands for the net loss of the corporate sector in real terms ￿ a proxy 
for the financial standing of firms. Alternatively we have capital ￿ a variable 
representing banks￿ balance sheets, a sum of capital and reserves in real terms. 
Loans are a sum of banks￿ lending to the corporate sector and households (in 
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the domestic currency only). They are deflated by a weighted average of the 
CPI and PPI, with weights corresponding to the share of respective loans in 
the total amount of loans. Capital and reserves are deflated in the same way, 
while the net loss of the corporate sector is deflated with the PPI. Data are 
quarterly statistics and all besides the interest rates are in logs. The sample 
covers the period 1997 Q1￿2006 Q1 (effective sample: 1997 Q4￿2006 Q1). 
In cases when we could not eliminate serial correlation from the residuals in 
any other way, the sample was shortened to 1998 Q1￿2006 Q1.
Trace statistic indicates that for yt,, lt, it
p, it
loan, capitalt there are 3 cointegrating 
vectors (Table A3 in the Appendix). The LM test does not show signs of 
autocorrelation (Table A5 in the Appendix). For yt,, lt, it
p, it
loan, losst , the trace 
statistic indicates 2 cointegrating vectors (Table A4 in the Appendix), and, as 
before, the LM test does not show signs of autocorrelation (Table A6 in the 
Appendix).
For yt,, lt, it
p, il
loan, capitalt we estimate the VECM applying a set of restrictions 
to obtain: (i) a loan supply equation, (ii) a loan demand equation, and (iii) an 
equation for the capital and reserves. In the loan supply equation we restrict 
coefficient standing at the GDP to zero and the coefficient standing at the 
policy rate to be equal to the coefficient standing at loan rate but with the 
opposite sign; for the loan demand coefficients at it
p and capitalt are restricted 
to zero; for capital and reserves equation we restrict coefficients at lt, it
p, 
and it
loan to zero. The first two equations are normalized with respect to lt, 
while the third one to capitalt. The VECM is over-identified, and the LR 
test shows that the over-identifying restrictions could be rejected. Namely, 
in this specification, capital and reserves seem to depend on the interest rate. 
This fact can be attributed to a plausible relationship between the interest 
rate and reserves ￿ a high interest rate increases the opportunity cost but at 
the same time it results costly to have too small reserves and have to borrow 
them in the market. Reserves account for about 40% of the sum of the 
aggregate ￿capital and reserves￿ but the obtained high value of the respective 
semi-elasticity makes us suspicious about the results. All obtained parameters 
have the expected sign and are statistically significant. The estimated income 
elasticity of loan demand seems to be too low at first sight, but since the data 
cover a relatively short period, and what most important, the period of a slow 
increase in loans to the non financial sector, the elasticity of 0.60 can be 
accepted
11 (the elasticities are shown in Table A7 of the Appendix). Impulse 
11 It should also be emphasised that we cover only loans in the domestic currency, whereas 
credits granted by domestic banks in foreign currencies have a considerable share in the amount 
of total credits. In addition, firms seek credits from foreign sources (see: Table A2).
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response functions are obtained from the Cholesky decomposition. The 
ordering is as follows: yt,, lt, it
p, il
loan, capitalt which means that we assume that 
the GDP and loans react to the monetary policy shocks with a delay, while 
the loan rate and capital adjust within the same quarter. Impulse responses 
look rather reasonably (see Figure 9)
12. GDP falls after the monetary policy 
shock and the maximum reaction takes place in the eighth quarter after the 
shock. The demand for loans also falls, but its maximum reaction comes later 
￿ in the fourteenth to sixteenth quarter. Shocks to the monetary policy rate 
induce, as expected, an increase in the loan rate. The upward movement of 
loans after the loan rate shock is, however, relatively small and temporary 
￿ it disappears after seven quarters and then a much greater downward shift 
can be observed. This last observation raises even more doubts with respect 
to this specification.
Now we shall estimate the VECM for the second specification that uses losst 
instead of capitalt.  This time there are only two cointegrating equations. 
Once again, in the loan supply equation we restrict coefficient at GDP to 
zero and the coefficient standing at policy rate to be equal to the coefficient 
standing at loan rate but with the opposite sign, whereas for the loan demand 
coefficients at it
loan and losst are restricted to zero. We test whether banks 
consider firms￿ balance sheets when they make credit decisions. As in the 
previous case, the VECM is over-identified but now LR test does not show 
that the over-identifying restrictions can be rejected (χ
2(2) = 2.12, prob.: 
0.35). Once again, all obtained parameters have the expected sign and are 
statistically significant. There is, however, a problem with the magnitude of 
the elasticities (Table 7). The income elasticity of loan demand is too low 
(0.12). On the other hand, the interest rate semi-elasticities of the loan supply 
seem far too big. The impulse responses (Cholesky decomposition with the 
ordering analogous to the previous case) of the GDP and loans to the policy 
rate shock display initial puzzles but afterwards both GDP and loans fall as 
expected. The credit puzzle seems to last too long which induced us to verify 
the assumption on the loans￿ stickiness reflected in the place they occupy 
in the Cholesky ordering. Putting it after the monetary policy rate and thus 
assuming that it adjusts within a quarter of the policy rate shock
13 brought 
about much more sensible impulse response (presented on the right hand side 
of the lowest row of Figure 10). The loss of firms moves upward after the 
12 To be able to interpret the obtained interest rate shocks as monetary policy shocks, we 
should have specified the VECM using also inflation. We do not introduce inflation because we 
were concerned about the shortness of sample and wanted to save the degrees of freedom. Thus, 
interpreting the obtained interest rate shock as monetary policy shock is somewhat overstated. 
13  Such ordering is also used in H￿lsewig, Winker, Worms (2001). 
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adverse shock to monetary policy. A shock to the loan rate induces an upward 
and relatively long-lasting movement of loans.
These results are ambiguous: on the one hand, some elasticities and 
semi-elasticities do not look reasonably, on the other ￿ impulse response 
functions are mostly plausible and both the elasticities and semi-elasticities 
can be somewhat distorted by the fact that we use only a part of the total 
amount of loans and the sample is short. The results seem to support only 
weakly the operation of the credit channel in Poland or to be more specific 
￿ the lending channel. This conclusion led us to examine more disaggregated 
data and verify the buffer stock behaviour of banks.
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3.2.3.  Credit channel ￿ disaggregated data
The exercise shown in section 3.2.2 was reproduced for disaggregated 
monthly data covering the period 1998:01￿2006:05 in respect of the total 
amount of loans for individual, private and state-owned enterprises and credit 
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in the current account. Owing to the data constraint we analyse the behaviour 
of investment, revolving and export loans for the respective firms over 
a shorter period, namely 2002:02￿2006:05. 
The model of loan supply and loan demand differs from that from section 
3.2.2 mainly in the specification of the loan supply ￿ instead of capital in the 
equation (4a), we use lost loans (i.e. loss claims):
l
s = f (it
p, it
loan, lost_loanst). (4￿a)
We expect that a tightening of the monetary policy shall, with a few-month 
delay, result in an increase of the amount of lost loans and in reduced bank￿s 
propensity to extend new loans. The alternative equation, where the net real 
loss of firms is included, remains unchanged:
l
s = f (it
p, it
loan, losst). (4￿b)
Finally, y in the equation (5￿) does not stand for the GDP, but instead ￿ for the 
real income of the respective firms:
l
d = f (yt, it
loan). (5￿)
Before focusing on the operation of the credit channel among various types 
of enterprises, we present some stylized facts related to the structure of output 
and the amount and structure of loans extended to firms.
Income of private enterprises, i.e. private firms employing more than 9 persons, 
has been booming since the mid-1990s mainly due to the privatisation process 
and, to a lesser extent, the greenfield investment of foreign capital as well 
as the newly-born domestic capital. Over the last ten years private firms 
increased their share in the total income by about 40 percentage points (to 
almost 75% in mid 2006); however, state-owned firms lost even more. Income 
of individual enterprises (micro-firms employing up to 9 persons), having at 
their disposal a small amount of capital, has been growing at a moderate rate 
and at present it approaches a 10% share in the total income (see Figure 11). 
State-owned enterprises employ about 55% of the total labour force, i.e. 
almost twice as much as private companies. Individual firms employ nearly 
15% of the total labour force.
Monetary transmission mechanism40










95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
Individual Private State
Income of the individual, private andstate firms.















98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
Individual Private State






































































































The investment, revolving, in current account and export credit.







Bank loans reflect the ownership structure of enterprises (see Figure 12) 
￿ almost 80% of the total amount of loans has been extended to private firms. 
Of the total amount of loans 26% are investment loans, which have grown by 
47% since Poland￿s accession to the EU. In the same period, the revolving 
credit and the credit in the current account increased at a twice lower rate. 
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The former rose at 8.5% rate and the latter, a solution that is more convenient 
for firms ￿ at 38% rate. Both the revolving credit and the credit in the current 
account finance the working capital of enterprises and the cost of inventories 
maintenance. Their share in the total amount of loans has remained unchanged 
over the analysed period (62%). The value of export credit decreased from 
PLN 300 million in 2002 to about PLN 90 million following accession to 
the EU. It was mostly due to the growing number of export-oriented foreign 
direct investment by multinational companies and the free access to the EU 
market. 
Micro firms (here called ￿individual￿), due to their small size and the lack 
of a long-lasting history of bank account, seem to be more dependent on the 
domestic banks￿ loans and vulnerable to banks￿ loan supply policy. The ratio 
of loans to the net income of these firms reaches 70%, compared to 41% for 
the private firms. Investment loans account for 36% of the total amount of 
loans, while short term loans, i.e. the revolving credit and the credit in current 
account ￿ for 48%. The remaining 16% of loans are connected with real estate 
and house purchases. The credit in the current account has been growing the 
most rapidly. Since Poland￿s accession to the EU, it has increased by 46%, 
while investment loans rose by 31%. 
The amount of loans granted to state-owned companies has dropped by 20% 
since mid 2004 and the decline was almost equally distributed among all 
types of loans. At the same time, the net income of these enterprises grew by 
1.3%. Hence, the ratio of loans to the net income has fallen to 24%, the lowest 
level among the analysed groups of enterprises.
Taking into consideration the disaggregated picture of the Polish credit 
market and presumed stylized facts concerning the credit channel operation, 
we expect the following behaviour of firms and banks: 
Firstly, there shall be a difference in the behaviour between large and small 
firms and between private and state-owned companies. On the demand 
side, the large firms, having a relatively easy access to the commercial paper 
market and/or being a daughter-company of a multinational corporation, 
shall be less dependent on the domestic bank financing including both 
investment expenditures and working capital. It may result in a  low 
interest rate semi-elasticity of the loan demand. On the other hand, the 
demand for loans shall be correlated with the real economic activity of 
firms (equation 5￿) but the direction of the reaction shall depend on firms￿ 
assessment of future economic conditions. If the expected future returns are 
•
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positive, the demand for loans may increase. The level of income elasticity 
of loan demand can be perceived as a measure of uncertainty attributed to 
the economic conditions by firms. A positive and low (much below 1.00) 
elasticity can indicate that a moderate rate of future returns combined with 
a  high uncertainty is expected. However, large firms or multinationals 
are less vulnerable to the current economic conditions and therefore this 
elasticity can be somewhat higher than for other groups of enterprises. 
On the supply side, if banks perceive large (denoted as ￿private￿ in our 
exercise) firms as less risky and easier to monitor, comparing with other 
groups of companies, both loan rate and short-term rate semi-elasticity of 
loan supply shall be relatively low. We assume that banks tend to decrease 
intermediation margins for their big clients provided that they have no 
losses and/or lost credits. 
Secondly,  on the demand side, smaller enterprises will postpone 
investment rather than increase their demand for investment loans 
following the tightening of monetary policy. However, small (￿individual￿) 
firms may rely heavily on short-term loans to finance working capital and 
inventories. Therefore, the interest rate semi-elasticity of the investment 
loan demand shall be relatively low and the respective elasticity of 
the revolving credits and credits in the current account shall be higher. 
Individual firms, relying more on external sources of financing, are 
presumably less risk averse than private companies. It may be supposed 
that particularly the demand for short-term loans financing current activity 
of individual firms is positively correlated with their real income, if the 
uncertainty is assessed as reasonable. It can result in a relatively high 
income elasticity of the loan demand, particularly for short-term credits. 
On the supply side, banks will not respond to such demand positively, 
adjusting loan supply rather moderately.
Thirdly, the state-owned sector is characterized by a high risk aversion 
on the one hand, and a huge lack of funds for investment and current 
activity on the other. Therefore, the demand for loans is a game between 
risk aversion and the lack of funds. It is also tailored by the financial 
standing of the state-owned enterprises ￿ they display net real loss. Thus, 
it is expected that both the loan supply and loan demand elasticities are 
relatively low.
Estimations were done for all disaggregated data mentioned above and the 
results are presented in Table 8 and Figure A4 in the Appendix. Owing to 




(parameters of equations) are shown in the table without their standard errors 
and t-statistics. We considered the respective elasticities as properly evaluated, 
if Johansen cointegration test indicated two cointegrating equations at the 
0.05 level, the equation parameters were significant at the 0.05 level and the 
parameters had a correct sign.
The estimation is complex, since it takes into account both types of bank 
products and various groups of enterprises. To make it easier to follow the 
detailed results let us briefly summarize the main findings:
It has been confirmed that there is a difference in the loan demand reaction 
between ￿private￿ and ￿individual￿ firms. The reaction of private companies 
to the monetary policy tightening is small and similar for all types of loans. 
Individual firms tend to resign from investing after an interest rate shock. 
Demand for investment loans is inelastic in state-owned enterprises.
We cannot confirm that the size of enterprises labelled here as ￿individual￿ 
and ￿private￿ is a characteristic that discriminates banks￿ behaviour after 
the monetary tightening. Instead, we observe that banks￿ reactions differ 
with respect to various products. 
A detailed inspection of the results presented in Table 8 seems to confirm 
most of our hypotheses. We have found that there is a difference in behaviour 
of loan demand between large (￿private￿) companies and micro (￿individual￿) 
firms. The reaction of the former to the monetary tightening is relatively 
low and similar for all types of credits. The interest rate semi-elasticities 
of investment and export loans as well as credits in the current account 
vary from ￿0.001 for export to ￿0.043 for investment loans. These levels 
are comparable with findings of H￿lsewig, Winker and Worms (2001) for 
Germany. The income elasticity of loan demand is also similar for all types 
of loans (it varies from 0.5 for investment loans to 0.6 for export credits), but 
it is twice as low as in the euro area. The relatively low elasticity can reflect 
enterprises￿ uncertainty about economic conditions resulting in an aversion 
to finance their activities from external sources. From the banks￿ perspective, 
the supply of loans depends on the type of credit. The interest semi-elasticity 
of investment loan supply amounts to 0.037 (similar to the loan supply in 
Germany) and for the revolving credits and credits in the current account the 
elasticity is more than ten times higher. It may indicate that the reaction of 
banks to the monetary tightening is higher with respect to the supply of the 
short-term credits (financing the working capital) than with respect to the 




The reaction of loan demand of individual firms is a little different. After 
monetary policy tightening these enterprises tend to resign from investment 
and curb their activity rather than be financed by loans. The interest-rate 
semi-elasticity of investment loan demand equals ￿0.17 (4 times as high as 
the case of private companies) and for the revolving credit: ￿0.53 (twice as 
much). Only the demand for credit in the current account seems to be almost 
unaffected by the monetary policy measures. Banks￿ credit policy towards 
micro firms clearly depends on the history of the firms￿ account ￿ a growing 
bulk of lost credits leads to a proportional fall in the supply of loans. On the 
other hand, the estimated spread semi-elasticity of investment loan supply 
which equals 0.76 is unexpectedly high (20 times higher than for private 
firms). This can be due to the relatively low amount of investment loans 
granted to micro firms and a great dispersion of credits.
Surprisingly, the elasticities of both loan supply and loan demand of 
state-owned companies look like the inversed elasticities of individual firms: 
demand for investment loans is inelastic with respect to both the loan rate and 
income. This phenomenon can result from a permanent lack of funds in these 
firms. The inelastic demand coexists with the inelastic supply of investment 
loans. To some extent, the inelastic supply of loans for the state-owned sector 
can be explained by its importance (too large and too ￿strategic￿ to fail). 
On the other hand, the total elasticity of loan demand of loans financing the 
working capital (the revolving and in the current account credits) is close to 
that of individual firms, but in state-owned companies the demand and supply 
of credits in the current account is more sensitive to the interest rate and 
income changes than it is the case for the revolving credit.
The demand for export loans seems to be insensitive to interest rate changes 
but is relatively sensitive to income changes, particularly those in state-owned 
companies. The supply of export credits is very low and depends heavily on 
changes in the loan rate.
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To conclude this section we would like to stress two findings:
Firstly, the operation of the credit channel at disaggregated level is better 
documented than at the macro level. In most cases the elasticities and 
impulse reaction functions are similar.
Secondly, with some exceptions (the investment loans of the private firms) 
the level of elasticities estimated for Poland differs significantly form 
these obtained for the Euro area but the reaction functions are similar. 
3.3. Buffer-stock behaviour
A crucial assumption in the bank lending channel theory is that monetary 
contraction drains banks￿ reserves, which forces banks that are unable to offset 
a decline in reserves
14 to adjust their assets, including loans. However, as 
empirical studies suggest, credit contraction can be significantly weakened by 
changes in the portfolios of the most liquid assets such as Treasury securities. 
Contrary to loans, Treasury securities can be liquidated easily and can, 
therefore, serve as a buffer-stock. Special features of the relationship between 
banks and borrowers result in the fact that, independently of the monetary 
policy measures, banks may be reluctant to reduce loan supply at least for 
certain borrowers. Credit lines are an example of such relationships. In this 
case an immediate reduction of financing could make borrowers unable to 
meet their previous liabilities. Another factor is a privileged position of ￿big￿ 
customers (such as large firms), having a long-time relationship with a bank. 
Evidence from the United States and the U.K. suggests that a tightening of 
monetary policy initially leads high-quality borrowers to demand more loans 
at prevailing interest rates, while other borrowers, for whom bank credit is 
critical as the only possible source of financing, are faced with a decline in 
loan supply. The net results of these opposite responses may be that the total 
bank credit is not immediately affected by the interest rate rise (Gerretsen and 
Swank (1998)). 
The buffer-stock behaviour may have consequences both for the interest 
rate channel and the credit channel, as documented in a number of empirical 
studies. As far as the interest rate channel is concerned, Altimari et al. (1997) 
show that the portfolio of Treasury bonds held by Italian banks played the 
role of a ￿secondary liquidity￿ that enabled them to offset potential results of 





the monetary contraction and lower the sensitivity of interest rates on loans 
to changes in the monetary policy. As for the credit channel, the buffer-stock 
behaviour tends to diminish the importance of bank credit as a transmission 
channel of the monetary policy and reduce the information content of credit 
about future changeover in the real economy. Garretsen and Swank (1998) 
check the relationship between German money market interest rates and bond 
holdings and loans of Dutch banks.
15 The main finding is that bond holdings 
are adjusted almost immediately in response to the interest rate shock, which 
combined with the sluggish reaction of the intermediated loans suggests 
that banks display buffer-stock behaviour. Similar evidence of buffer-stock 
behaviour in the Netherlands is provided by Kakes (1998), who concludes 
that it leads to a  limited importance of the bank lending channel of the 
monetary policy. The role of liquid assets in weakening bank loans￿ reaction 
to the monetary policy measures is also confirmed in Germany ￿ Kakes, 
Sturm and Maier (1999) show that German banks respond to a monetary 
contraction by adjusting their securities holdings, rather than by reducing 
their loans portfolio.
It seems that Polish banks follow a similar behaviour. The volatility of the 
most liquid assets, namely Treasury securities and central bank bills, is higher 
than the volatility of loans (Figure 13).
 















































































































































change of Treasury and NBP securities
change of loans (in domestic currency)
15 In the period considered in the study, the Dutch guilder was tied to the Deutsche mark; 
therefore, Gerretsen and Swank (1998) use the German short-term interest rate as a  policy 
variable.
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The figure suggests that loans and highly liquid securities are not perfect 
substitutes in terms of commercial banks￿ asset management policy. To 
assess differences in their responsiveness to the monetary policy measures 
we estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) model. This type of model gives 
a possibility to measure the dynamic impact of different types of random 
disturbances on systems of variables. A  list of series used in the model 
consists of five variables covering the period 1997.01￿2006.05: interbank 
interest rate WIBOR 1M playing the role of the policy variable, Treasury and 
central bank securities in commercial banks￿ portfolios, domestic currency 
loans, industrial output and the consumer price index. All variables except 
the policy interest rate are in logs. Both types of banks￿ assets and industrial 
output are in real terms. The ordering of variables reflects the assumption that 
the policy rate affects first the banking variables (liquid assets, loans) and then 
the real sector (GDP) and inflation
16. The procedure, which orders the policy 
variable in the last instance, corresponds to the assumption that innovations 
to the interest rate affect other variables with a lag. This assumption seems 
plausible taking into account that we use monthly data and the transmission of 
interest rate impulse to the real sector via bank balance sheets is ￿ by nature 
￿ a relatively slow process. After the VAR had been estimated we generated 
the impulse response functions to one standard deviation shock to the interest 
rate (Figure 14). For each variable the horizontal axis shows the number of 
months that have passed after the shock, while the vertical axis measures 
￿ the response of the relevant variable. A value of 0.1 corresponds to 10 basis 
points in the case of the interest rate and inflation and 10% of the baseline 
value in the case of other variables.
16 This way of ordering variables is consistent with the methodology adopted by Gerretsen 
and Swank (1998) in their Dutch VAR model and other studies, such as Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1993).
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According to the money view, a tightening of monetary policy should result 
in a similar fall in loans and securities held by banks, which are considered 
perfect substitutes. This is clearly contradicted by the Polish results. The 
reaction of bank loans is lagged, whereas the reaction of bond holdings is 
immediate and stronger than that of bank loans. These results indicate that 
securities holdings of banks and loans are not perfectly substitutable
17 and the 
17  Different degrees of liquidity, profitability and risk of the various kinds of bank assets may 
be perceived as the main causes of their imperfect substitutability (Hernando (1998)).
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buffer-stock behaviour occurs. Given the observation that the most important 
reaction of banks after the interest rate impulse is the adjustment of their most 
liquid assets, the lagged response of bank loans is likely to be related to a fall 
in loan demand (the interest rate channel). Real activity and inflation show 
a negative reaction after the interest rate innovation ￿ in the case of inflation 
the maximum reaction occurs approximately a year after the monetary policy 
shock.
Although the reaction of individual variables may not be stable across 
different VAR￿s specifications, the result concerning the existence of the 
buffer-stock behaviour seems to remain robust
18.
Similar VARs were built to analyse the supply of bank loans for different types of 
borrowers, i.e. individual, private and state-owned enterprises and households. 
Although the short-time response of loans defined in this disaggregated manner 
remains statistically insignificant, the responses give some intuitions concerning 
the different pattern of responses of banks with respect to different groups of 
borrowers (Figure 15). The loans of households seem to be reduced shortly after 
the interest rate shock, while the loans of the corporate sector are reduced with 
a delay, even after their initial increase. This increase may be attributed mainly 
to the response of loans of the state-owned enterprises and differs substantially 
from reactions of the remaining types of loans.
To check whether the credit channel is further weakened by a possibility of 
resorting to the foreign parent entities of Polish banks we have constructed 
two VAR models containing various kinds of foreign capital which could be 
considered as a substitute for internally raised funds: inter-company loans and 
debt securities. Our VAR models consisted of four variables: GDP level, CPI, 
inter-bank short-term interest rate, approximating the NBP policy rate and 
either loans from direct investors, i.e. inter-company loans or debt securities. 
We used a simple Cholesky decomposition method with the ordering as above. 
Using a sample of quarterly data from 1999 to 2006, we found that after the 
monetary policy shock there was no increase in debt securities (in fact there 
was even a drop). On the other hand, inter-company loans slightly increased 
18 We experimented with different VAR￿s specifications: reducing the number of variables 
(excluding industrial output or prices) or replacing them with alternative ones (inflation with the 
price level, loans denominated in domestic currency with the sum of loans in domestic and foreign 
currency etc.), changing the lag structure, excluding time trend from exogenous variables etc. The 
conclusions on the immediate reaction of highly liquid assets to interest rate innovations and the 
postponed as well as relatively weak (in some cases even statistically insignificant) reaction of 
bank loans are similar across these specifications. Thus the existence of buffer-stock behaviour in 
Poland seems to be robustly confirmed.
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just after the shock but the result is statistically insignificant (the respective 
impulse response functions are presented in the Appendix, Figure A3). In sum, 
these results suggest that although potentially capital inflows from the foreign 
direct investors can harm the operation of the credit channel, we have not 
found empirical evidence that they really did over the period 1999￿2006. 
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4.  Summary and conclusions
This study offers a new picture of the operation of two important channels 
of the monetary transmission mechanism in Poland ￿ the credit channel 
and the interest rate channel. Contrary to previous studies, the period under 
consideration in the present study, i.e. 1997.Q1￿2006.Q1, is characterised by 
a homogenous monetary policy regime, i.e. inflation targeting. It makes the 
specification of VAR models we use more accurate.
In comparison with the results of the previous VAR studies on the monetary 
transmission mechanism in Poland its delays seem to have become shorter. In 
particular, the maximum reaction of the price level to the interest rate shock 
occurs 16￿20 months after the innovation, while in Wr￿bel and Pawłowska 
(2002) it was 20￿25 months. It may be caused to some extent by a more 
adequate specification of the VARs on a longer and more homogenous sample 
period taken into consideration. But on the other hand, it can also result from 
the development of the financial system in Poland, making economic agents 
more exposed to the interest rate innovations, a fast increase of the weight of 
private firms in the economy (as measured by the growth of income generated 
by this sector) as well as the Poland￿s accession to the European Union. 
Evidence on the credit channel in Poland is mixed. Analyses on the aggregated 
data seem to confirm, albeit only weakly, that firms￿ balance sheets do 
matter in the loan supply decisions of banks. The obtained elasticities and 
semi-elasticities in the loan supply function can be regarded as dubious, but 
impulse response functions display a reasonable shape. Analyses performed 
on the disaggregated data confirm that the credit channel does operate ￿ after 
the monetary policy tightening banks seem to reduce short-term loans (i.e. 
credit in current account), while the longer term loans for investment display 
lower semi-elasticities with respect to the interest rate and therefore seem to 
be more protected. It means that various types of loans are not considered by 
banks as close substitutes. The fact that banks protect investment loans more 
than the credit in the current account can be interpreted as a flight to quality.
In our estimates we could not confirm the hypothesis that banks￿ decisions 
on the loan supply depend on the size of firms, i.e. the hypothesis that after 
a negative monetary policy shock loans for smaller firms seem to be reduced 
more eagerly. This result, however, can be due to the fact, that the aggregate 
labelled here as ￿individual firms￿ includes entities employing more than 54
9 persons, i.e. both very large entities as well as rather small ones. Data 
constraints make it impossible to make a different grouping of enterprises. 
In sum, the obtained results lead us to the conclusion that the role of the 
credit channel in the Polish monetary transmission is relatively weak. This is 
consistent with the results of previous studies on the credit channel in Poland. 
One of the explanations explicitly addressed in the study is that due to the 
fact that banks hold large portfolios of highly liquid assets, such as Treasury 
and central bank securities, they are able to insulate their loan portfolios 
after monetary tightening. An immediate reaction of liquid assets to the 
interest rate innovations and a delayed and relatively weak reaction of bank 
loans seem to be robustly confirmed by the various specifications of VAR 
models. Bearing in mind the present scale of the surplus liquidity and the 
expected inflow of the EU membership related funds, it may be expected that 
the buffer-stock behaviour of banks also in the medium term will affect the 
credit channel operation. A fact that we did not find the empirical evidence 
that banks in Poland tended to by-pass the credit channel resorting to the 
foreign markets does not mean that they will not act this way in the future. 
Development of new financial instruments and growing weight of the stock 
exchange as a source of capital will additionally depress the strength of the 
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Figure A3   Foreign capital inflow to the Polish banking sector: inter-company loans 
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Appendix57
Table A1   Changes of the zloty exchange regime since 1990
Date Change
1 January 1990 Exchange rate fixed to the dollar, 1USD=0.95PLN
16 May 1991 Exchange rate fixed to a currency basket (45% USD, 35%DEM, 
10% GBP, 5% FFR, 5% CHF), devaluation to 1USD=1.11 PLN
14 October 1991 Crawling peg to the currency basket; crawling rate 1.8% monthly, 
NBP margin –0.5%
26 February 1992 Devaluation to the basket by 12%
27 August 1993 Crawling rate 1.6, devaluation by 8%
13 September 1994 Crawling rate 1.5%
30 November 1994 Crawling rate 1.4%
16 February 1995  Crawling rate 1.2%
6 March 1995 NBP margin –2%
16 May 1995 Introduction of crawling band –7%, crawling rate 1.2% , interbank 
rates subject to free market forces and NBP intervention
22 December 1995  Revaluation by 6%
8 January 1996 Crawling rate 1.0%
26 February 1998 Crawling rate 0.8%, band –10%
17 July 1998 Crawling rate 0.65%
31 July 1998 The last NBP foreign exchange intervention 
10 September 1998 Crawling rate 0.5%
28 October 1998 Band –12.5%
1 January 1999 Change of the currency basket; euro 55%, dollar 45%
25 March 1999 Crawling rate 0.3%, band –15%
7 June 1999 NBP is not obliged to perform transactions with commercial banks 
during fixing
12 April 2000  Floating exchange rate
Source: National Bank of Poland and own calculations of the authors
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Table A2   Financial account (1997￿2006, EUR million)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Financial 












722 -116 -514 -96 42 -1 208 -1 137 -1 055 -1 986 -3 590
Equity securities 50  1 -161 -25 -76 -283 168 -43 -474 -2 287




1 146 1 629 648 3 531 1 098 3 367 3 369 8 519 11 836 1 530
Equity securities 530 1 546 13 470 -339 -588 -717 1 295 1 027 -1 490




-667 1 879 -3 135 -4 314 -4 495 1 878 -412 -9 452 -2 242 -2 466
Monetary 




36 47 -6 -56 -40 -39 -39 -30 -132 22
MFI (excl 
Central Bank) -952 1 968 -2 529 -3 384 -3 766 3 210 384 -8 259 -627 -1 209




1 068 3 059 5 491 1 441 745 489 2 847 -953 -1 447 6 906
Monetary 




-43 -328 -210 -299 -3 402 -540 -1 156 -1 833 -4 990 -978
MFI (excl 
Central Bank) 636 1 322 1 889 -518 327 -516 1 767 881 535 3 976
Other sectors 971 1 888 3 455 3 677 3 687 2 056 2 228 34 1 489 4 533
Financial 
derivatives -11 0 534 313 -364 -1 023 -758 154 186 -668
Source: National Bank of Poland
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Table A3   Cointegration test ￿ y, l, i
p, i





≤ 1 61.05 40.17
≤ 2 29.50 24.28
≤ 3 10.78 12.32
≤ 4 3.38 4.13
* MacKinnon, Haug, Michelis (1999)
Table A4   Cointegration test ￿ y, l, i
p, i





≤ 1 45.26 40.17
≤ 2 22.45 24.28
≤ 3 5.92 12.32
* MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999)
Table A5   LM test ￿ VECM ￿ y,, cr, i
p, i






Probs from chi-square with 25 df.
Table A6   LM test ￿ VECM ￿ y, cr, i
p, i






Probs from chi-square with 25 df.
Appendix60
Table A7   Loan to firms and households supply and demand functions: estimation results
(standard errors in ( ); t-statistics in [ ])
￿credit channel specification￿ ￿bank lending specification￿
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1 CointEq2 CointEq3 Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1 CointEq2
y 0.000000 -0.602287 -0.549899 y 0.000000 -0.122766
(0.00688) (0.00474) (0.00591)
[-87.5208] [-115.967] [-20.7797]
l 1.000000 1.000000 0.000000 l 1.000000 1.000000
i





loan -0.006525 0.042453 0.000000 i
loan -0.376350 0.013811
(0.01220) (0.00303) (0.04560) (0.00130)
[-0.53486] [14.0309] [-8.25413] [10.6606]
capital -1.081806 0.000000 1.000000 loss 0.304926 0.000000
(0.00934) [-115.791] (0.07951)
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